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It seems only natural for minorities in the former Soviet Union to feel a constant pull 
towards separatism. Their national borders were drawn almost arbitrarily—often to 
encourage conflicts—and a nascent sense of self-determination that followed the end 
of Soviet communism certainly plays a role in the region’s separatism, even today. 
Georgians, in particular, have witnessed their share of nationalist struggles, together 
leaving thousands dead and hundreds of thousands homeless. 
 
In Georgia’s mostly Armenian region of Javakheti, however, the potential for conflict 
has always rested just beneath the surface, requiring a greater and untapped impetus to 
inspire rebellion. As Georgia’s southernmost region, Javakheti shares not only a 
border with Armenia, but also a culture, religion, and language, as Javakheti is more 
than 90% Armenian. Despite being born in Georgia, few of these Armenians feel any 
allegiance to Georgia at all.  After all, Soviet leaders in the early 20th century 
relocated thousands of Armenian families to Georgia’s southern regions to provide a 
protective buffer between the Ottoman Empire and the rest of the Soviet Union.  
Culturally, linguistically and politically, the Georgians in Javakheti are Armenian.  
 
And while any unrest in Javakheti pales in comparison to the tension in Georgia’s 
authentic separatist regions—Abkhazia and South Ossetia—Javakheti has all the 
makings of a civil ethnic conflict. To start, the most common language in Javakheti is 
Armenian, and Georgian is not a required part of the local curriculum for the same 
reason that Russian is not a required part of the Georgian curriculum—both nations 
feel a burgeoning sense of pride and self-determination. Javakheti has a better 
relationship with Yerevan, Armenia’s capital, than it does with the Georgian capital, 
Tbilisi. The central government provides very little financial assistance to Javakheti, 
citing economic difficulties and limited resources, which inevitably leave the 
undeveloped region’s infrastructure in pieces and the people alienated. 
 
Unlike in Abkhazia and South Ossetia—breakaway regions enjoying de-facto 
autonomy under Russian patronage—calls for secession or reunion with the "home 
country" have never been quite as loud in Javakheti, even though most of the unrest 
tethers to economic and cultural concerns—both typical catalysts for rebellion. 
 
More specifically, Armenian political groups on both sides of the border continuously 
push Tbilisi to give the Armenian language equal official status to the Georgian 
tongue in the Javakheti region. Yet like most countries with a large ethnic majority, 
Georgia requires that its public schools teach the Georgian language and Georgian 
history above all others.  Yet Javakheti’s Armenians neither speak the Georgian 
language nor know its history.  With a population that is less then 10% ethnic 
Georgian, however, such a law could hardly be enforced, as the local bureaucracies 
and infrastructure are entirely sustained by Armenians who speak virtually no 
Georgian.  Making an immediate transition into Georgian is impossible, even 
assuming the Armenians wanted to abandon their cultural heritage.  Moreover, there 
is said to be implicit discrimination against the Armenian language in the region’s 
state-run offices.  According to the US State Department, Javakheti has a “relatively 
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independent media,” but any news about Georgia is only available in the Armenian 
and Russian languages.  Nearly all of the news concerns Armenia and is in Armenian.  
 
Individually and collectively, measures designed to integrate (or assimilate) a 
country’s diverse groups are prone to backfire.  As is the case in most separatist 
struggles, Tbilisi is trying to balance its policies in order to give its ethnic minorities 
just enough freedom to embrace their own cultures, but not so much freedom as to 
isolate these minorities even further.  Unfortunately, the best balance between these 
two goals is often a symbolically powerful law that is completely unenforceable, such 
as requiring a group to embrace another culture, and doing nothing to ensure such a 
transition. 
 
Immediately following Georgia’s independence in the early 1990’s, Javakheti nearly 
became independent itself, due to Georgia’s inexperienced and weak central 
government.  Only in the last decade has Georgia tried to keep Javakheti on a tight 
(but inevitably long) leash, understanding that the language barrier is the primary wall 
to integration.  Without at least minimal assimilation, Javakh Armenians will continue 
to make additional demands for mandatory Armenian history curriculums in local 
schools, an end to the general “Georgianization” of Armenian culture and heritage, a 
Georgian minority rights law, the construction of a highway linking Javakheti to 
Yerevan (which Armenia will finance), and the recognition of Javakheti political 
movements pushing for the region’s political autonomy.  
 
Russia and the Base 
 
Perhaps the most important humanitarian concern for Armenians living in Javakheti is 
the Russian military base in Akhalkalaki, the region’s capital. After years of 
negotiations, Russia has agreed to withdraw from the base, which has been a crutch to 
Javakheti’s economy since its opening in the mid 1990’s when Georgia agreed to the 
Russian military presence in order to restabilize the recently independent country.  
Employing more than a thousand mostly Armenian workers, upwards of 10,000 locals 
are dependent on a salary at the base. Moreover, the Russian soldiers consume a large 
portion of Javakheti’s produce—the region’s primary source of income. President 
Saakashvili has promised that the Georgian government will fill the void left by the 
Russian military, whose departure is a great cause for celebration in Tbilisi, despite 
years of protest by Armenians living both in Armenia and Javakheti. Specifically, 
Saakashvili proposed to use the produce consumed by Russian troops to feed 
Georgian troops instead, but many analysts have suggested that surplus produce will 
only be a part of the crisis when Russia pulls out.  According to official statistics, 
Javakheti produces 30 times more potatoes and 210 times more milk than the 20,000 
soldiers in the Georgian army can consume.  Besides, inviting Georgian soldiers to 
Akhalkalaki is likely to serve as kindling to the tension. 
 
Recognizing this, on April 29, President Saakashvili altered his remedy on a visit to 
Javakheti: "We're not planning to set up a new military unit [there]. But we will offer 
those who serve on this base to join the Georgian armed forces in return for a higher 
pay. To those who turn down this proposal, we will offer a separate social-
rehabilitation program, business [training]. These people must not feel they will lose 
out on the deal. On the contrary, they must benefit from the fact that Georgia is 
developing," Saakashvili said.  Another solution, put forward recently by Georgian 
 3 
Parliamentary Speaker Nino Burjanadze is to open “food processing enterprises” in 
Akhalkalaki to create new jobs. The ethnic Armenians in Javakheti are 
understandably skeptical, as they have seldom seen Tbilisi offer either relief or 
solidarity (see TOL, “Never Again,” Feb.25, 2004). 
 
For its part, Russia has its own ambitions in a Caucasus that has looked increasingly 
to the West to provide its necessary political and economic support. Armenia happily 
gives Moscow its desired influence in the southern Caucasus, in exchange for Russian 
protection from Armenia’s neighboring Muslim enemies (Turkey to the west and 
Azerbaijan to the east), both of which maintain strict blockades at their borders with 
Armenia. The dispute over Turkish responsibility for the deaths of more than one 
million Armenians during and after World War I has long frozen Armenian-Turkish 
relations. And Azerbaijan is no friendlier, having been humiliated by Russian-backed 
Armenia in the early 1990’s in the Nagorno-Karabakh war and forced to tolerate an 
island of Armenian-dominated land in the middle of Azerbaijan. Ever since, 
Azerbaijan has been pining to retake Nagorno-Karabakh using sophisticated weapons 
purchased with its windfall of petrodollars. 
 
Yet regardless of any real or exaggerated threat to Armenia, Russia has always been 
eager to manipulate the region’s conflicts—much to Tbilisi’s fury—in Abkhazia, 
South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh, and there is little reason to think that Russia 
would not similarly arm Javakheti separatists, were it ever so inclined.  In fact, for 
years Tbilisi has accused Russia of colluding and inciting conflict in Javakheti, most 
recently in early March when protesters insisted that the violent death of a Javakh 
Armenian was ethnically motivated.  
 
As Georgian MPs often do, Parliament Speaker Nino Burjanadze suggested that the 
protests and general unrest can be attributed to “serious external forces, who try to 
trigger destabilization in this region”—a coded punch at Russia for its military 
presence in Akhalkalaki.  In fact, according to some Tbilisi officials, weapons 
belonging to Parvents, a Javakh paramilitary group, once belonged to the Russian 
base in Akhalkalaki, and were used in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.  Naturally, 
Russia continues to deny this, and as recently as April 26, Georgia’s own Interior 
Minister, Vano Merabishvili, said Moscow has had nothing to do with the recent 
unrest in Javakheti, despite Russia’s regional interests.    
 
Granted, if Russia ever did fully arm and promote Javakheti’s separatists, Yerevan 
would have to agree to it, and Armenia feels isolated enough as it is without angering 
Georgia. Blockaded from both sides, Armenia must rely on its northern border with 
Georgia and southern border with Iran for all the nation’s international interests. So 
Yerevan cannot afford to be blockaded by Georgia, whatever Russia’s regional 
ambitions might be.  For this reason is most pan-Armenian solidarity limited in 
Javakheti, despite a rather convincing pro-Javakh lobby in Armenia.  
 
The Mouthpiece 
 
Much of the protests over Tbilisi’s poor treatment of its Armenian citizens actually 
come from political parties in the Armenian ruling coalition government, which have 
a greater capacity for political mudslinging than their relatively disorganized and 
inexperienced Javakh counterparts. One party, “Zor Airenik” (Mighty Homeland) was 
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even formed by natives of Javakheti who now live in Armenia (there are more than 
100,000 such emigrants, most of whom left for economic reasons). And other parties 
such as the “Nor Serund” (New Generation), the Armenian Democratic-Liberal 
Union, and the Ramkavar Azatakan Party all have similar agendas to ensure the safety 
of the Armenians in Javakheti living in fear of ethnically motivated harassment and 
violence. Nearly all of these Armenian political parties argue that increased political 
autonomy and self-governance in Javakheti are warranted given Javakheti’s 
ostracized culture and security concerns.  
 
These moderate parties often call on the Saakashvili regime to pay more attention to 
the needs of Javakheti and its residents, while seldom encouraging the outright 
secession of Javakheti. Even still, calling for mere “political autonomy” was deemed 
separatist enough for Tbilisi to prohibit “Virk,” a local political movement in 
Javakheti, from registering as a political party in July 2002.  In fact, this is why most 
ethnic Armenians who run for Georgia’s Parliament do so under a mainstream 
party—like Saakashvili’s National Movement Party—while it is no secret that they 
represent Georgia’s ethnic Armenian population.  
 
Nevertheless, despite being elected by Georgia’s Armenian population, a handful of 
MPs—among them Van Baiburt, a native of Javakheti—is often criticized for not 
fighting hard enough for Javakheti’s interests.  On March 16, Baiburt controversially 
said that “the Georgian authorities are not imposing any restrictions on Georgia’s 
Armenian population,” and went on to say “the government has agreed to allow 
official business to be conducted in Armenian in the area” because Tbilisi understands 
that it is “unreasonable” to expect and demand that Armenians suddenly speak 
Georgian.  And in any case, he noted, it is “unrealistic” for Javakheti’s civil society to 
demand a heightened status for the Armenian language in Javakheti.  
 
In an October 2005 interview, Baiburt even indicated that he believed Russia and 
Armenian radicals are to blame for Javakheti’s dangerous separatist leanings.  
Unsurprisingly, then, Javakheti’s moderate politicians—and certainly the radical 
ones—feel abandoned by MPs like Baiburt and have called him “a puppet in the 
hands of some dark forces.”  As a result, Javakh Armenians feel they must look for 
help from Armenia and, to a lesser extant, Javakheti’s local government and civil 
society.   
 
In response, the Georgian government and media often paints Javakheti’s civil society 
as as instigating separatist and anti-Tbilisi sentiment in the region, and use this as a 
basis for keeping these “movements” from becoming recognized political parties.  
While Virk’s political ambition has received the most attention, other local civic 
organizations—like the “United Javakh-Democratic Alliance” (a union of 8 youth 
organizations) and “Javak”, another group also pushing for political autonomy—are 
encountering equal resistance for allegedly instigating violence.  Virk leader David 
Rstakian, however, attributes the relative calm in Javakheti (compared to South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia) to the restraint of these demonized groups, which he says 
actually prevent Armenian protests from escalating into outright separatism.  In the 
past, Rstakian has also insisted that outright secession or reunion with Armenia is not 
necessary to ensure the safety and prosperity of the Javakh people—that only an 
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“administrative-territorial unit within Georgia [is] required in order to have Armenian 
schools and have conditions which would be conducive to pursuing the Armenian 
way of life.  Georgia is a member of the UN and therefore the same standards of the 
protection of national minorities must be observed here as are accepted by other 
democratic nations… We do not oppose Georgia's political system [and] we do not 
call for war or strife… but sooner or later, Georgia will have to agree to a federative 
structure.” 
 
In contrast, however, Vahan Chakhalian, leader of the United Javakh-Democratic 
Alliance has said that the Russian withdrawal leaves local Armenians defenseless, and 
that United Javakh would therefore retaliate if Georgian troops tried to take their 
place—regardless of whether they came to relieve the farmers of their surplus 
produce. Starkly, such declarations are eerily similar to those put forward by 
Abkhazian and South Ossetian separatists in the early 1990’s, immediately preceding 
two very bloody conflicts, which have yet to be resolved.  
 
Likewise, “Dashnaktsutiun,” a radical century-old political party in Armenia’s ruling 
parliamentary coalition, often reacts to Tbilisi’s policies in Javakheti by issuing 
heated press releases—even warning that discriminatory policies in Javakheti give the 
people “no other choice than the use of force to protect their interests and dignity.”  It 
is worth noting, however, that Dashnaktsutiun seldom wins more than a handful of 
Armenia’s 131 parliament seats, and frequently threatens to leave the coalition for 
varying reasons. 
 
So far, the bulk of the political parties and movements in Javakheti are not, in fact, 
pushing for violent resistance, but they are pushing for cultural and political 
autonomy, if not outright secession and reunification with Armenia.  But Javakh 
Armenians may not need much saber rattling to push them over the edge, as events in 
the last year illustrate.  
 
Approaching the Threshold 
 
For instance, in March 2005, 6000 Javakh Armenians rallied in Akhalkalaki to protest 
a resolution in the Georgian Parliament that called for the withdrawal of the city’s 
Russian base and used the occasion to protest against their many other grievances.  
 
In July 2005, Javakh Armenians from the city of Samsar refused to allow a group of 
students and nuns from Tbilisi to restore a nearby church dating back to the 12th 
century.  After accusing the nuns and students of trying to “Georgianize” the 
Armenian Church and culture, the argument quickly turned physical and left a number 
of people severely injured.  That same day, in Akhalkalaki, a group of Javakh 
Armenians and Greeks raided a Georgian school for similar reasons.  
 
In October 2005, Tbilisi tax officials closed 10 small shops owned by ethnic 
Armenians in Akhalkalaki for financial irregularities, which prompted protests by 
hundreds in front of the district’s state administration building.  Local police tried to 
disband the protesters with rubber truncheons and by firing gunshots into the air, 
injuring many protesters.  
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And more recently, on March 9, an ethnic Armenian was killed in a bar fight in 
Tsalka, a city in Javakheti’s neighboring region of Kvemo-Kartli; soon afterwards, 
hundreds of ethnic Armenians protested the man’s death, claiming he was targeted in 
Georgia’s natural “climate of ethnic intolerance.” The Tsalka jail holding the 
suspected killers were soon surrounded by protesters calling for swift justice. 
 
And only two days later, ethnic Armenians gathered nearby in Akhalkalaki to protest 
the dismissal of ethnic Armenian judges, who (Armenians believe) were fired for not 
knowing and using the Georgian language in court.   To reinforce the now-frequent 
demand that the Armenian tongue be made officially equal in status to Georgian, the 
Akhalkalaki protesters raided a local court chamber, ousted a Georgian judge, and 
then stormed both a Georgian Orthodox Church and the local branch of Tbilisi State 
University. United Javakh issued a statement that described the dismissal of the 
Armenian judges as “cynically trampling on the rights of the Armenian-populated 
region.” More broadly, the statement warned that the "destructive trends in the 
Georgian government's policy" illustrated Tbilisi’s desire to “crush the will of 
Javakh's Armenian population to protect its right to live in its motherland."  
 
To ease the tension, however, a Georgian ombudsman quickly ruled that the bar fight 
was merely a “communal crime,” not ethnically motivated; and likewise, Georgian 
officials continue to maintain that the judges were fired for misconduct, not for 
anything having to do with their ethnicity or ignorance of Georgian.  Nevertheless, 
Tbilisi has appointed a number of judges in Javakheti who only speak Georgian and 
must use translators to conduct judicial proceedings, much to the frustration of local 
Armenians, who dismiss this practice as Georgian cultural imperialism.  
 
In the last two months, Javakhetians have held a number of rallies—both organized 
and spontaneous—which have protested and physically blockaded the Russian 
military withdrawal.  Eager to facilitate the withdrawal of the Russian troops, 
Georgian President Saakashvili on April 28 asked his Armenian counterpart, Robert 
Kocharyan, to help ease the tension in Javakheti.  According to a source in the 
Saakashvili Administration, the Georgian leader argued that Moscow is trying to 
make its withdrawal from Akhalkalaki as painful as possible for Georgia, by subtly 
manipulating the ripe civil tension within the isolated region. 
 
Meeting Halfway? 
 
While visiting Javakheti on April 19 and again on April 29, President Saakashvili 
pledged to put an end to Javakheti’s isolation in Georgia, beginning with the 
construction of roads in the region—including one from Akhalkalaki to Akhaltsikhe 
(the capital of neighboring region of Samtskhe) and another road connecting 
Akhalkalaki to Tbilisi. Funded by the U.S. Millennium Challenge Account, these 
infrastructural developments, Saakashvili added, “mean that Javakheti’s geographical 
isolation from the rest of Georgia will end once and for all; this means that local 
peasants will be able to freely export their products from here; this means that more 
businesses will come here; this means that more transit will take place here…. Roads 
and development—these are what Javakheti needs now.”  
 
With policies like these, it seems that Tbilisi is hoping to recruit friendly Javakh 
Armenians by encouraging interaction between Georgia’s diverse ethnicities.  More 
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transit means more cooperation, which brings interdependence and perhaps enough 
assimilation to quell separatist rhetoric and ambitions.  
 
In fact, if national policies like these actually come to fruition, they could help 
integrate and intertwine the Georgian and Armenian communities through significant 
economic and humanitarian gains. But these are not the gains that the Armenians 
insist they need most: for instance, Javakheti will get an important highway, but it 
traverses the 300 km to Tbilisi, not Yerevan.  
 
Tbilisi refuses to give Javakheti a broader self-governance or autonomy package 
because such policies are, in fact, just as likely to isolate Javakheti. Worse still, 
loosening the leash might set a dangerous precedent for successful separatism. So it 
seems, then, that the politicians have no choice but to return to the scales and reset the 
balance for another day of gambling, perhaps hoping simply to merely break even. 
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